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In this paper, we investigate a novel (2, 2)-threshold scheme and then generalize this to a (n, n)-
threshold scheme for quantum secret sharing (QSS) which makes use of the fundamentals of Analytic
Geometry. The dealer aptly selects GHZ states related to the coefficients which determine straight
lines on a two-dimension plane. Then by computing each two of the lines intercept or not, we obtain
a judging matrix whose rank can be used to determine the secret stored in entangled bits. Based
on the database technology, authorized participants access to the database to obtain the secret
information and hence the secret never appears in the channel. In this way, the eavesdroppers fail
to obtain any secret by applying various attack strategies.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
The novel discovery that quantum effects could pre-
vent secret information from being eavesdropped in
an insecure channel, which is illustrated by Wiesner
[1], and then by Bennett et al. [2], attracts all sci-
entists’ eyes to the quantum cryptography. In 1999,
Hillery et al. [3] applied three-particle and four-particle
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states to imple-
ment an initial QSS scheme. From then on, quantum
secret sharing plays an increasingly significant role in
the secret protection of quantum cryptography.
Specifically, the QSS scheme is known as a threshold
scheme [4]. Suppose that we divide a message into n
pieces such that any k of the n pieces could recover the
message, but any sets of k − 1 or fewer pieces failed
to, so the scheme is called a (k, n)-threshold scheme. In
this way, people can forbid some dishonest participants,
at most k − 1 in this threshold scheme, from knowing
the whole message without the help of the honest ones.
Motivated by the unprecedented developing pace of
QSS, a myriad of protocols and schemes have been pro-
posed. For instance, cooperated with quantum secure
direct communication (QSDC), Zhang presented a novel
concept of quantum secret sharing [5], which proved to
be known as QSS-SDC, then he made use of swapping
quantum entanglement of Bell states to propose a mul-
tiparty QSS protocol which was based on the classical-
message (QSS-CM) [6]. Moreover, a (n, n)-threshold
scheme based on GHZ state and teleportation was pro-
posed by Wang et al. [7]; after that Han and Liu et
al. [8] illustrated a multiparty QSS-SDC scheme which
used photons and random phase shift operations (RP-
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SOs). Furthermore, a quantum secret sharing experi-
ment based on a single qubit protocol in telecommu-
nication fiber was reported by Bogdanski et al. [9];
then Markham and Sanders [10] illustrated the graph
states for quantum secret sharing. Recently, Sarvepalli
et al. [11] illustrated the method to share secret by us-
ing quantum information, which converted a set of pure
[[n, 1, d]]q Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes to per-
fect secret sharing schemes; after that the first experi-
mental generation and characterization of a six-photon
Dicke state was demonstrated by Prevedel et al. [12],
then they showed the applications in multiparty quan-
tum networking protocols such as quantum secret shar-
ing, open-destination teleportation, and telecloning.
Hence, with the recent high-speed developments of
large-capacity storage technology and its appendant
database technology, it is innovative for us to store
the GHZ states and their corresponding coefficients of
straight lines in a particular table which belongs to
a specific database. Also, the security mechanisms of
databases protect the information in databases from
being known by uncertified users. Therefore, after con-
sidering recent discoveries both on theories and exper-
iments, we make use of these characteristics to imple-
ment a novel QSS scheme which is based on the fun-
damentals of Analytic Geometry. In fact, the GHZ
states particles just work as the carriers which carry
these states to the participants, and the secret never
appears in the channel. After the GHZ measurements
on received particles, certified participants could access
to the database and search for the coefficients of straight
lines. The positions of lines are on behalf of the secrets
which actually store in entangled bits. Accordingly, the
participants judge the lines’ positions together and ob-
tain the secret.
In this paper, we introduce some elementary knowl-
edge of this scheme, and detailedly describe the imple-
mentation of the (2, 2)-threshold QSS scheme in sec-
2tion II. In section III, we generalize the (2, 2)-threshold
QSS scheme to a (n, n)-threshold one and depict this
implementation in detail. Then in section IV, we con-
sider some different attack strategies and analyze the
security of the scheme by calculating the corresponding
maximum Von Neumann entropy.
II. TWO-PARTY QUANTUM SECRET
SHARING BY USING THE PRINCIPLES OF
ANALYTIC GEOMETRY
Before we illustrate the scheme, we should review
some basic theory of Analytic Geometry. As is known
to all, every straight line on a two-dimension plane has
an equation of the following form:
Ax+By + C = 0, (1)
where A and B are not both zero. Conversely, if A and
B are not both zero, then every equation which likes the
Eq.(1) determines a straight line. Furthermore, if two
straight lines don’t intersect on a two-dimension plane,
they must parallel each other on it. (In this paper,
we ignore the situation that the two lines coincide each
other, which can be understood as a unique case that
they are parallel.)
We should prepare some entangled bits as the secrets
being shared. In detail, the secrets are actually stored
in these entangled bits. We randomly choose two bits
which are given by Eq.(2) as the secret “M0” and “M1”.
For instance, we choose the base |S〉1 = |00〉 − |11〉 as
the secret “M0”, and select the |S〉3 = |01〉−|10〉 as the
secret “M1”. And the coefficients of entangled bits are
decided by all participants before every communication.
In this way, the entangled bits work as the secret shared
in the following scheme. Considering the orthonormal
bases of Bell states, we obtain the general form of the
entangled bits’ bases:
|S〉i = a|ϕiψi〉+ (−1)ib|(1− ϕi)(1− ψi)〉, (2)
where
ϕiψi =
{
00 i ∈ (0, 1),
01 i ∈ (2, 3).
In fact, the four vectors create a quantum system.
Let’s consider the general form of orthonormal bases
of GHZ states given as:
|GHZ〉i = 1√
2
(|ϕiψiφi〉+(−1)i|(1−ϕi)(1−ψi)(1−φi)〉),
(3)
where
ϕiψiφi =


000 i ∈ (0, 1),
001 i ∈ (2, 3),
010 i ∈ (4, 5),
100 i ∈ (6, 7).
FIG. 1: The figure shows the implementation of (2, 2)-
threshold QSS scheme based on Analytic Geometry. The
triangle connects the three qubits in GHZ state. The dashed
lines which connect two qubits represent the two partici-
pants have obtained the shared entangled bits.
We can prepare three qubits in a GHZ state of the bases
above. Hence, the well-prepared particles can be used
to carry GHZ states to participants.
After these preparations talked above, we propose a
novel two-party quantum secret sharing shceme. It can
be achieved by the following four steps:
(i) The dealer Alice randomly chooses two entangled
bits given by Eq.(2) as the secret (e.g. “M0” and “M1”)
all by herself. Then she negotiates with Bob and Candy
to make sure the coefficients of the bits, but she never
tells them the bases she had chosen. Besides, she pre-
pared qubits in GHZ states.
In order to make the GHZ states of the particles relate
to specific entangled bits, Alice must properly selects
the GHZ states.
(ii) Alice sends the GHZ state particles to Bob and
Candy via a public insecure channel, respectively. After
received the triplets, Bob and Candy implement GHZ
state measurements on the received particles.
(iii) According to result of the measurement, Bob and
Candy look up each separate table in database (e.g. Ta-
ble I) to obtain a set of coefficients of a specific straight
line, then they get together to find out whether the two
straight lines intersect or not. If the two lines parallel,
the secret Alice shared is “M0”, otherwise the secret is
“M1”.
(iv) After the judgement, Alice declares the base of
the entangled bit she had chosen in the public channel.
In this way, both Bob and Candy get to know the secret
shared by Alice.
3TABLE I: Bob and Candy get a set of coefficients of the
specific straight lines as a form ax + by + c = 0 after the
GHZ state measurement, then together find out whether
the two lines intersect or not. To each specific set of the
coefficients which satisfies a
a′
= b
b′
(where a′, b′ 6= 0), the
two straight lines are parallel each other, so the secret of
Alice is “M0”. If the two lines intersect at a single point,
the secret is “M1”.
Bob’ table Candy’s table
|GHZ〉i a b c |GHZ〉j a
′ b′ c′
|GHZ〉0 a0 b0 c0 |GHZ〉0 a
′
0 b
′
0 c
′
0
|GHZ〉1 a1 b1 c1 |GHZ〉1 a
′
1 b
′
1 c
′
1
|GHZ〉2 a2 b2 c2 |GHZ〉2 a
′
2 b
′
2 c
′
2
|GHZ〉3 a3 b3 c3 |GHZ〉3 a
′
3 b
′
3 c
′
3
|GHZ〉4 a4 b4 c4 |GHZ〉4 a
′
4 b
′
4 c
′
4
|GHZ〉5 a5 b5 c5 |GHZ〉5 a
′
5 b
′
5 c
′
5
|GHZ〉6 a6 b6 c6 |GHZ〉6 a
′
6 b
′
6 c
′
6
|GHZ〉7 a7 b7 c7 |GHZ〉7 a
′
7 b
′
7 c
′
7
In fact, Alice should have known the table which Bob
and Candy keep in advance. Therefore, in step (i) she
can decide which GHZ state bases to choose to prepare
the triplets aptly. In Table I, for example, we intend to
make the coefficients satisfy the following:
a
a′
=
b
b′
(4)
or
a
a′
6= b
b′
. (5)
Thus if Alice wants to share the secret “M0”, she ran-
domly chooses GHZ states from the table which sat-
isfy Eq.(4); otherwise, she will use the states shown
as Eq.(5). Therefore, after the separate measurements,
Bob and Candy will find out whether their straight lines
parallel or intersect when they get together.
III. EXTENSION OF TWO-PARTY QUANTUM
SECRET SHARING
Suppose that N parties would like to take part in
this secret sharing, we should generalize the above two-
party QSS scheme to a N-party one. If each two of the
N lines are parallel each other, the secret is “M0”. On
the other hand, if each two are intersecting, the secret
proves to be “M1”. Similar to the proposed two-party
QSS scheme, we get the following four steps:
(i) The dealer Alice randomly chooses two entangled
bits shown as Eq.(2) all by herself. Then she negoti-
ates with all other participants to make sure the coef-
ficients of the bits without telling them the bases she
FIG. 2: This is a judgement matrix used to judge whether
each two of the N lines are paralleling or intersecting. If li
and lj (li represents the label in the row, and lj means the
label in the column) parallel each other, the number is “0”;
if li and lj intersect, the number at corresponding position
is “1”. Attention, we regulates the numbers in the diagonal
line are all “0”.
had chosen. What’s more, she prepares the particles by
properly choosing the bases given by Eq.(3), which are
related to the corresponding coefficients.
(ii) Alice sends the well-prepared GHZ state parti-
cles to everyone of the N parties via a public insecure
channel. After received the triplets, every member im-
plements a GHZ state measurement on the accepted
particle respectively.
(iii) According to result of the measurements, ev-
eryone, such as Bob, looks up his individual table in
database (e.g. Table I) to obtain a set of coefficients of
a specific straight line. Then N members get together
to judge whether each two lines are intersecting or par-
alleling. After that Alice declares the bases of entangled
bit she had chosen via the public channel.
In order to judge whether each two of the N lines are
parallel or intersecting, we first number the N lines as
l1, l2, . . . , ln. Then we create a matrix shown as FIG. 2,
the “0” in the matrix means the li and lj (li represents
the label in the row, and lj means the label in the col-
umn) are paralleling, the “1” means the li and lj are
intersecting. The numbers in the diagonal line of the
matrix are all “0”.
(iv) Participants obtain the secret shared by Alice by
judging the rank of the n order square matrix: if the
rank is zero, which means the matrix is a zero matrix,
the secret is “M0”; if the rank of the matrix is n, the
secret is “M1”; otherwise, the results contain no infor-
mation.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As is known to all, we are always challenged by eaves-
dropping, for the channels used for sending the parti-
cles are insecure. What’s worse, one dishonest partici-
pant or more may cheat the others to obtain the secret.
Hence, in order to analyze the security of the illustrated
scheme, we introduce Von Neumann entropy to evalu-
4ate the maximum information entropy eavesdroppers
can get.
Similar to the Shannon entropy which measures the
uncertainty with a classical probability distribution,
Von Neumann entropy is described with density opera-
tors replacing probability distributions. Hence, we have
the density operator [13]:
ρ =
∑
i
pi|φi〉〈φi|. (6)
In the above equation, |φi〉 proves to be one of various
states in a quantum system, and pi is the corresponding
probability. Hence Von Neumann defined the entropy
of a quantum state by the following equation:
S(ρ) ≡ −tr(ρ log ρ). (7)
In this formula logarithms are taken to base two. If λx
are the eigenvalues of ρ, then Von Neumann’s definition
can be re-expressed as:
S(ρ) = −
∑
x
λx logλx. (8)
After the introduction, let’s consider the eavesdrop-
ping strategies and evaluate the security by computing
the maximum Von Neumann entropy.
A. Eavesdropping In the Insecure Channel
If the eavesdropper Eve wants to obtain the infor-
mation from the channel, he has two methods: (i)Eve
intercepts and captures the particles from the sequences
which Alice sends to the participants; (ii) Eve intercepts
the particles from the channel, then uses the GHZ mea-
surements to measure the particles and resends them to
the corresponding parties respectively.
If Eve applies the (i) method to eavesdrop the chan-
nel, then N parties fail to realize that the eavesdroppers
have intercepted the particles. In order to obtain the se-
cret, Eve should measure the particles he has captured.
Before that, he must access to the separate tables in
database which record the coefficients of straight lines
from different parties. Otherwise it’s impossible for him
to find out the coefficients. However, even though he
gets all the tables kept by the N-party, he may not get
the right coefficients selected by Alice. Eve randomly
chooses a basis to measure the captured particles, then
for each participant, he has a probability of 1
8
to get
the right GHZ state. Thus the eavesdropper only gets
a probability of (1
8
)N to acquire all the correct coeffi-
cients of the corresponding straight lines. In this way,
Eve can hardly obtain the correct judging matrix if N
is large enough. Admittedly,Eve seems to have a rather
small probability to obtain the secret. However, since
he don’t know the accurate coefficients of the entan-
gled bits, even he get to know the bases of the bits, the
eavesdropping would be meaningless.
Then let’s calculate the maximum Von Neumann en-
tropy eavesdroppers can get. According to column
matrix form of the four vectors which are obtained
from Eq.(2), we get the outer product operator |φi〉〈φi|.
Since the probability pi of each outer product operator
is (1
8
)N , we obtain the density operator:
ρ = diag
(
a2
23N−1
, a
2
23N−1
, b
2
23N−1
, b
2
23N−1
)
. (9)
Therefore, based on the fundamentals of matrix, we ob-
tain the eigenvalues by calculating the |ρ − λI| = 0,
where I is a unit matrix.
Moreover, since a and b are the coefficients of basis
vectors in the quantum system, we have a2 + b2 = 1.
According to Eq.(8), we get the equation of maximum
Von Neumann entropy:
S(ρ) =
3N − 1
23N−2
− 1
23N−3
(a2 log a+ b2 log b). (10)
Suppose that N = 2, a = b = 1√
2
, hence we get the
maximum Von Neumann entropy:
S(ρ) =
3
8
(bit). (11)
In other words, by applying this attack strategy the
maximum Von Neumann entropy Eve can get is only 3
8
bit.
In order to avoid this attack strategy, all participants
of this communication, including Alice, regulates the
length of these sequences in advance. Or Alice just
declares the length of the series before she sends these
sequences. If the number of particles fails to equal to the
declared amount, the corresponding participants inform
Alice that eavesdroppers do exist in the channel, then
they abort this communication and replace the current
channel with another one.
The (ii) attack strategy applied by Eve will surely be
detected, for the GHZ measurements will destroy the
original state of the particles. After measurements on
these received particles, N parties get together to judge
if each two are intersecting or paralleling and create the
judgement matrix. If the rank of the matrix is neither
0 nor N , N participants know that at least one of them
has been eavesdropped, hence they terminate the cur-
rent communication and seek for another channel. Eve
only has a probability of 1
8
to obtain the correct GHZ
state of a straight line, and the probability to get all
the coefficients is (1
8
)N , which approaches to 0 if N is
large enough. Furthermore, even though he gets all the
correct GHZ state shared by Alice, he fails to know
the coefficients of the entangled bits, he would never
get any information in this way. Suppose that N = 2
5and a = b = 1√
2
, the maximum Von Neumann entropy
eavesdropped by Eve also is 3
8
bit.
Hence, in face of the eavesdropping in the insecure
channel, this scheme will surely avoid giving out any
secret shared by Alice, hence it is secure in any means.
B. Dishonest Participants
Besides the eavesdropping in the insecure channel,
dishonest participants may also reveal the secret. Ac-
cording to the scheme, all participants decide the coef-
ficients of the entangled bits without knowing the bases
Alice had chosen. Hence before they together to judge,
the dishonest participants could guess the specific en-
tangled bit from a pair, thus each shares a probability
of 1
2
. And a pair of entangled bits is randomly selected
from the four entangled bits given by Eq.(2). Hence
in the 6 pairs, each specific entangled bit contains a
probability of 1
2
to be chosen. Accordingly, the final
probability to guess the correct basis of entangled bits
equals to 1
4
.
Then let’s compute the maximum Von Neumann en-
tropy one dishonest participant can get. According to
the four vectors of the quantum system, and the prob-
ability pi is
1
4
, we get the density operator:
ρ = diag
(
a2
2
, a
2
2
, b
2
2
, b
2
2
)
. (12)
We calculate the |ρ − λI| = 0 to get the eigenval-
ues. Hence, we obtain the equation of maximum Von
Neumann entropy as follow:
S(ρ) = 1− 2(a2 log a+ b2 log b). (13)
Suppose that a = b = 1√
2
, then
S(ρ) = 2(bit). (14)
Hence, in this case, the maximum Von Neumann en-
tropy one dishonest participant can get is 2 bit.
Therefore, it would be difficult for the dishonest par-
ticipants to obtain just a few pieces of the secret in-
formation. In this way, that would be meaningless to
apply this eavesdropping strategy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel quantum se-
cret sharing scheme, which makes use of the fundamen-
tals of Analytic Geometry as well as matrix. In fact, we
realize this scheme in a completely different method.
The GHZ state particles are just worked as carriers of
the coefficients of specific straight lines. Hence the se-
cret doesn’t cling to the triplets which are transmitted
in the insecure channel. The dealer properly selects the
entangled bits and controls corresponding GHZ states.
Then the secrets are decided by the positions of specific
straight lines which are actually determined by the GHZ
states. Since the secrets never appear in the channel,
the eavesdroppers fail to obtain any secret by intercept-
ing the particles transmitted in the channel.
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